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CONTRASTING FRANCO-AMERICAN 
PERSPECTIVES ON SOVEREIGNTY 
SOPHIE eLA VIER" 
PART I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The findings of this paper augment Keohane's argument! that 
sovereignty is a useful "conceptual lens" in the study of International 
Relations and that understanding divergent conceptions of sovereignty in 
Europe and in the United States is crucial to shedding light on the 
formulation of their respective policies. Indeed, the first goal of this 
paper is to expand on Keohane's premise and to address how France2 and 
the United States understand sovereignty. The second goal is to argue 
that the current conflicting perspectives on sovereignty displayed by 
* Assistant Professor of International Relations, San Francisco State University. This paper 
was presented at the Centennial Regional Meeting of the American Society of International Law 
(west) at Golden Gate University School of Law, in April 2006. 
I. Robert 0 Keohane, Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the United States. in 
Integration. in AN EXPANDING EUROPEAN UNION: REASSESSING THE fuNDAMENTALS 307-339 (lain 
Begg, John Peterson & JHH Weiler, Eds., Blackwell Publishing 2003). Kehoane is the architect of 
the so-called neoliberal instituionalism. His main argument is that sovereignty needs to be 
"unbundled" and understood beyond its classical and unitary perspective. 
2. While much of the argument pertains to Western Europe and not only to France, the choice 
to focus on France sterns from both historical and recent events: Historically, France and the United 
States have had intertwined political and philosophical foundations to the building of their 
democracies, after WWII France became the key architect of the European construction. France is 
also a permanent member of the Security Council and has vocally opposed the United States on the 
issue of the conflict in Iraq. Finally, both the United States and France believe they have a special 
moral role to play in the world. 
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France and the United States are a departure from a historical pattern 
whereby, at each key time period, challenges to the shared definition of 
sovereignty and of the world order it symbolized, came from non-
dominant actors within or without the system in question. This paper 
posits that we are currently witnessing contradictions amongst the 
dominant actors. The third task of this article is to argue that the United 
States' current position on sovereignty, its meaning and its function, 
perpetuate a system that favors the use of force to resolve disputes. By 
contrast, the "multi-perspective" sovereignty espoused by France within 
the European context, could provide a new paradigm for a world order 
guaranteed by international rule of law and not by the use or the threat of 
the use of force. Finally, this paper concludes that these fundamental 
differences go beyond an academic debate and carry with them 
significant normative, economic, and political consequences that make 
diplomatic confrontations between the two countries unavoidable. 
II. RESTATING THE ISSUE 
Central to a systematic review of the concept of sovereignty are the 
following: first, the question of sovereignty, as it was made clear in the 
Lotus case,3 is one of allocation of authority: who has jurisdiction over 
what, and what are the mechanisms in place to protect this 
allocation? Some of the mechanisms are composed of explicit rules and 
more or less coercive methods of enforcement; other mechanisms are 
internalized by society in a discrete value system shaping behavior as 
well as explicit rules. It appears that at each key period of history, the 
meanings assigned to sovereignty have embodied that the discrete value 
element necessary to legitimize the explicit mechanisms put in place to 
preserve the allocation of authority among the main actors in the system. 
As such, sovereignty is concurrently both a normative concept and a 
practice. In the words of Samantha Besson: 
As a normative concept, the concept of sovereignty 
expresses and incorporates one or many values that it 
seeks to implement in practice and according to which 
political situations should be evaluated [ ... J Concept 
determination amounts therefore to more than a mere 
description of the concept's core application criteria: it 
3. S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.l.J. (Ser. A) No. 10. 
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implies an evaluation of a state of affairs on the basis of 
sovereignty's incorporated values.4 
This statement is in agreement with Walker's position that: 
sovereignty works by giving authority to definitions [ ... ], 
the whole point of [modern] sovereignty is that it does 
not exist and yet it has tremendous effects; it does not 
exist and yet it is constantly enacted; it has no 
foundations yet is always foundational. Whatever it is, it 
is perhaps the strongest term in the modern political 
world. 5 
3 
This point is adequately reenforced by Elshtain's statement that the 
"development of the political notion of sovereignty has been 
characterized as a process of ideology creation, the use of an abstract 
theological structure to describe the temporal political structure."6 In that 
sense, the contextual meaning of discourse is as relevant as the rules 
themsel ves and, while the use of the term "sovereignty" has persisted, 
the subjective values assigned to it have varied over time. Krassner 
synthesizes this approach by asserting that "the meaning of sovereignty 
and the actions that can be undertaken or directed by a sovereign are and 
have always been, both contested and ambiguous."7 
Of equal concern is that the allocation of authority, the mechanisms to 
protect it, and the values assigned to sovereignty as a way to 
conceptualize and legitimize it, belong to the dominant powers whose 
survival is ensured by the system they themselves create. As a result, at 
each distinctive era, there is fighting and rivalry for control - what is 
fought for is more authority or even hegemony in the system. There is 
no conflict over the system of meaning that sovereignty carries. Indeed, 
until recently, sovereignty was what Paul Kahn calls a "club of victors." 
Why is there no sovereignty for Quebec, Catalonia, 
Scotland, Burgundy, or Provence? Why is there 
4. Samantha Besson quoted in Dan Sarooshi, The Essential Contested Nature of the Concept 
of Sovereignty: Implicationsfor the Exercise by International Organizations of Delegated Powers of 
Government. 2S MICH. J. INT'L 1. 1107, IllS (2004). 
S. R.BJ. Walker, Peace in the Wake of Sovereign Subjectivities. in THINKING PEACE, 
MAKING PEACE 26 (Barry Hindess & Margaret Jolly, Eds., Canberra: Academy of the Social 
Sciences in Australia, 2(02). 
6. See Jean Bethke Elshtain, Sovereign God. Sovereign State. Sovereign Self, 66 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 13S5 (1991). 
7. Stephen D. Krassner, The Hole in the Whole: Sovereignty. Shared Sovereignty and 
International Law, 25 MICH. J.lNT'L L. 1075. (2004). 
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sovereignty in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and a single Federal 
Republic of Germany? Each question is answered by a 
narrative of battles lost or of power successfully 
asserted. s 
Undeniably, the following historical review will assert that up until this 
juncture, the dominant powers have been remarkably consistent in 
forming an implicit consensus as to the subjective meaning they assigned 
to sovereignty. Challenges to the meaning of sovereignty have, up until 
the recent transatlantic alliance crisis, which is partly the object of this 
paper, come from individuals within the system who were excluded from 
decision making, or from forces outside the system. 
III. HISTORICAL REVIEW 
It is common in the literature on sovereignty to use the Peace of 
Westphalia as a pivotal date for the study of modern politics. There is a 
Eurocentric bias to this framework, especially taking into account many 
other civilizations' considerations on sovereignty,9 but considering the 
influence of Western ideology on international politics and law, it is a 
necessary task indeed to concentrate on European history. It i~ always a 
challenge to identify the appropriate starting point of a historical 
overview. Within the context of a study on sovereignty in the European 
space, it appears judicious to begin when sovereignty started to embody 
an iron clad value system. 1O Thus, the Middle Ages seems the most 
appropriate starting point when sovereignty was defined as God's 
sovereignty.ll Not surprisingly, the King of the Francs, Clovis' 
conversion to Christianity and baptism in 496 is commonly accepted as 
the onset of the Middle Ages in Western continental Europe!2 Clovis' 
conversion gave him the support of the Church in his territorial 
conquests and perpetuated the belief that he had a divine mandate. For 
8. Paul W. Kahn, The Question of Sovereignty,4Q STAN. J.INT'L L. 263 (2004). 
9. See, for example, Native American concepts of sovereignty and how they differ from 
European understandings in: Ron Gable, Sovereignty in the Blood: Cultural Resistance in the 
Characters of James Welch, WICAZO SA REVIEW, Autumn 1993, at 37-43. 
10. By contrast, the Greek ciIy states (which are often regarded as precursors of the modem 
nation-state system), envisioned sovereignty as the prerogative to exercise internal power and 
engage in external relations on a equal footing, but not necessarily as a value. Similarly, the Roman 
Empire was sovereign in its control over population and territories, not as a value, but as a 
consequence of it military might. 
11. See Daniel Engster, DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY: THE ORIGINS OF MODERN STATE POWER, 
(Dekalb, Northern lllinois University Press 2(01). 
12. See Mortimer Chambers, Raymond Grew, David Herlihy, Theodore K. Rabb, Isser 
Woloch, THE WESTERN EXPERIENCE, VOLUME I TO THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. (New York: 
MacGraw Hill 1995). 
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the reasons stated above, the pre - Westphalian era of the Middle Ages in 
Western continental Europe will be the first period studied in this essay. 
The second area of attention will be on the Westphalian era itself. For 
each period, the paper will address the dominant powers or forces, the 
value they assigned to sovereignty, the consequent justification of 
allocation of authority, the mechanisms to protect this allocation, and the 
mechanisms to reproduce or even expand the system, thus created. 
Central to this review is the understanding that for both periods, the use 
of force was necessary to protect the system of allocation of authority, as 
well as to expand the boundaries of the system. 
A. THE PRE-WESTPHALIAN ORDER 
Undoubtedly, the Church was the hegemonic power during the entire 
Middle Ages. While a succession of strong leaders followed Clovis, 
none could rule without the support of the Church. 13 Most 
conspicuously, it was the Pope who crowned Charlemagne Emperor of 
the Occident in 800. 14 Following Charlemagne's troubled succession and 
the subsequent split of his empire in 843 by the Treaty of Verdun,15 his 
grandsons could not effectively combat outside threats and their 
authority was soon supplanted by various lords. These lords interacted 
among themselves and with their vassals to form the framework of a 
complex feudal system. In this framework of overlapping secular 
jurisdictions, the concept of Church sovereignty remained unchallenged. 
John Ruggie adequately describes medieval Europe as a "patchwork of 
overlapping and incomplete rights of government," which was 
"inextricably superimposed and tangled."16 The only true and exclusive 
sovereignty was that of God and of his earthly representative, the Pope. 
An abstract from the Dictus Papae of Gregory VII (1073-1085) 
appropriately summarizes and confirms this assertion: l ? 
1. The Roman Church was created by God alone .... 
2. Only the sovereign (italics added) pontiff is by law 
called universal.. .. 
13. The 6th to the 10th century: a new Orientation for the Church, available at, 
http://dlibrary.acu.edu.aulstaffhome/yukoszarycz/ecc/MOD4.HTML (last visited May 17, 2006). 
14. [d. 
15. Wikipedia: Treaty of Verdun, available at, http://en.wikipedia.orglwikilTreaty_oCVerdun. 
16. John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International 
Relations 47 Int'l Org. 149-50 (l993). 
17. C. Warren Hollister, Joe W. Leedom, Marc A. Meyer & David S. Spear, MEDIEVAL 
EUROPE: A SHORT SOURCE BOOK 183-84 (New York: MacGraw Hill 1992). 
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9. Only the pope's feet can the princes kiss .... 
12. He can depose the emperor .... 
19. No one can judge him .... 
These principles established the legal consequences of the belief in 
God's sovereignty. Indeed, the allocation of authority provided for the 
universal jurisdiction of the Pope, as well as his immunity from all other 
jurisdictions, national or international. In that sense, while the feudal era 
was one of overlapping jurisdictions of the secular powers and of the 
Church, there was an unchallenged belief in the overall supremacy of the 
Church's expression of God's sovereignty. IS 
This belief system justified various enforcement mechanisms. First, 
within the European space, the Church itself was active in the 
suppression of dissent l9 and in spreading its doctrine through the 
edification of churches and monasteries. More notably, cathedrals 
offered the illiterate masses the benefit of a religious education through 
sculptures, paintings, and stained glass which taught both testaments in 
many visual representations.20 Outside the European space, the Church 
undertook to protect and/or expand its power through its struggle with 
the Muslim world - first in the Middle East in a series of crusades 
(starting in 1095), then much closer to home by reclaiming Spain by the 
13 th century.21 Finally, especially by the end of the Middle Ages, the 
universal, all embracing jurisdiction of the Pope took on a truly global or 
even universal component by claiming jurisdiction over population and 
territories worldwide (whether Christian or not). The Treaty of 
Tordesillas in 1494 justified the expansion of Europe outside of its 
continental confines by conferring it the legitimization of a religious 
mission.22 Whether by crusades, as an expression of just war, or by 
colonial expansion as a duty to Christianize, the use of force was a 
legitimate tool of policy. lochnick and Normand capture the spirit of the 
era when "[c]hivalric rules actually served to protect the lives and 
property of privileged knights and nobles, entitling them to plunder and 
18. Chambers et ai, supra note 12. 
19. [d., at 266. 
20. See, for example, the description of the use of Wall paintings in teaching, available at 
http://www.stmargaret-streatley.org.uklWallPaintings.htm. 
21. The Christian Crusades 1095-1291, available at, 
http://www.gbgm-umc.orglumvlbiblelcrusades.stm. 
22. Treaty between Spain and Portugal concluded at Tordesillas; June 7, 1494, available at, 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalonlmodeur/modOOI.htm. 
6
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 14 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol14/iss1/2
2008] PERSPECTIVES ON SOVEREIGNTY 7 
kill peasant soldiers, non Christian enemies and civilians of all religions 
and ethnicity."23 
The profits generated by this social order caused a power struggle among 
the dominant forces of the Middle Ages: the Pope (or the Church), 
European monarchs, and powerful feudal lords. Noticeably absent was a 
challenge to a concept that well served their need for mercantile wealth 
and power that ensured their dominant positions in a, presumably 
God-given, hierarchal, and unequal society (both at home and abroad).24 
Challenges to this construction came from non-dominant forces, 
individuals and/or units excluded from the decision-making power and 
the benefits of the system. Essentially, the feudal organization gave 
power to the Church and its clergy, and to the military (kings and lords). 
Opposition came from outside of these two groups, and took the form of 
a rebellion against the Church and the emergence of a powerful 
non-religious and non-military class of merchants, artists, and 
philosophers excluded from decision making. 
The Church, fraught with corruption,25 became the object of its biggest 
challenge to date to its doctrinal supremacy. Martin Luther6 proposed, 
in a revolutionary approach, that the Church was no longer needed as an 
intermediary between God and Man. Meanwhile, Calvin27 advocated 
strict interpretation of the Scriptures, putting salvation in the hands of 
God, not those of priests. Under their influence, the Protestant 
movement was instrumental in weakening the Church in Western Europe 
and the transformation of the world order that its previous strength had 
justified. 
In the meantime, the ruling order of the knights was also under attack 
from a new class of people, as merchants grew in wealth and power 
(often exceeding that of the nobility).28 At the same time, humanism in 
both artistic and scientific expressions spread throughout Europe, the 
23. Chris Jochnick and Roger Nomand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of 
the Laws of War, 35 HARV.INT'L L. J. 49, 61 (1994). 
24. Medieval Anguillara, A Study in Feudal Lordship, available at, 
http://www.dicksonc.act.edu.aulShowcaselClioContents/chivalry/anguillara.html. 
25. After the great Plague, the Church capitalized on the fear of judgment day by selling 
indulgences, in essence offering assurance of redemption in exchange for money. (See Chambers et 
ai, supra note 12) 
26. Martin Luther, MARTIN LUTHER: SELECTIONS FROM HIS WRITINGS (John Dillenberger, 
Ed., 1958). 
27. John Calvin, CALVIN ON GoD AND POLITICAL DUTY (John T. McNeil, Ed., Macmillen, 
New York, 1950). 
28. Medieval Merchant Culture, available at, 
http://www.brown.edulDepartmentslltalian_Studies/dweb/society/srtucture/mercahnt_cult.shtml~ 
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belief that men endowed with reason could understand and eventually 
master everything. Both the merchant class and the humanists benefited 
from each other through a well established system of patronage. 
Humanist philosophers formulated a new theory of sovereignty. While 
advocating different perspectives from each other, Hobbes, Bodin, and 
Machiavelli all departed from the previous ideology of Church 
sovereignty and advocated state sovereignty. In light of the chaos of 
overlapping jurisdictions, they argued that any reliable government, 
whether tyrannical (Hobbes), or Constitutional (Locke), or imposed 
(Bodin)29 would be a better alternative than overlapping levels of 
authority and Church corruption. 
Finally, the end of the Middle Ages took place in the context of all of 
these challenges and was precipitated by the religious wars and the 
subsequent peace of Westphalia in 1648.30 New decision makers and 
dominant powers emerged and with them, new definitions of sovereignty 
and new mechanisms. 
B. THE WESTPHALIAN ORDER 
The date of 1648 was as significant in launching state sovereignty as a 
value as 496 had been in affirming God's sovereignty as a value. Indeed, 
the Peace of Westphalia established the modern system of states, each 
independent from each other, equal to each other, and recognizing no 
supranational power, especially that of the Church.3l God's sovereignty 
was replaced by states' sovereignty, but the latter carried with it the same 
sense of theological value: a hegemonic belief that states not only exist 
as such, but that their sovereignty is the result of a universal norm that 
"rested on foundations different but no less religious than those of the 
medieval church."32 This is well summarized by Paul Kahn's statement 
that: 
the history of modern political evolution is in substantial 
part a story of the growing autonomy of the sovereign 
from the church but it wrong to think of that simply as a 
29. See Jean Bodin, SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH, 15750 (M J Tooley, trans, Basil: 
Blackwell 1955), Thomas Hobbes, LEVIATHAN PART I AND II (1651) quoted in Brad Roth, 
The EruJuring Significance of State Sovereignty, 56 Fla L. Rev. 1017, 1020-21, n.l2 (2004). 
30. Treaty of Westphalia; October 24, 14648, available at, 
http://yale.edullawweb/avalon/westphal.htm. 
31. Sovereignty, available at, http://plato.stanford.edulentries/soverignty. 
32. Constantin Fasolt, Sovereignty aruJ Heresy, in INFINITE BOUNDARIES: ORDER, DISORDER 
AND REORDER IN EARLY MODERN GERMAN CULTURE 336 (Max Reinhart, Ed., Kirksville, Mo: 
Sixteenth Century Essays and Studies, 1998). 
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secularization of the sovereign - rather it was [is] a 
process of sacralization of the state. 33 
9 
God's sovereignty was no longer expressed though the universal control 
of the Church, yet rather than disappearing, it found its expression in the 
belief that monarchs were appointed by the grace of God. In that sense, 
"the sovereign body was the mystical corpus of the state in which all the 
subordinate parts were present," whereby "just as the Church was the 
body of Christ, the state was the body of the sovereign."34 
Just like in the name of God, sovereignty-specific structures were 
established in the name of state sovereignty, new structures had to be set 
up to reinforce states' power. This process perpetuated the belief that 
state sovereignty was a superior norm. The following portion of the 
paper offers a systematic look at the value of state sovereignty, the 
allocation of authority it legitimizes, the enforcement mechanisms it 
justifies, and the subsequent world order it creates and reproduces. 
Throughout the Westphalian era, the dominant actors were states. 
During the first part of the Westphalian era, most of those states were 
more or less authoritarian monarchies.35 In this context, sovereignty 
belonged to the state, but the state was personified by its king (or queen): 
the sovereign himself. "L etat, c'est moi," allegedly said Louis the 
XIV. After the French arid the American revolutions, the locus of 
sovereignty did not change; it still belonged to the state, but 
progressively the state was seen as the reflection of the general will of 
the people or of the nation.36 According to Shaw: 
Sovereignty until comparatively recently was regarded 
as appertaining to a particular individual in a state and 
not as an abstract manifestation of the existence and 
power of the state - the sovereign was a definable 
person to whom allegiance was due. This 
personalization was gradually replaced by the abstract 
concept of the state, but the basic mystique remained. "37 
33. Kahn, supra note 8, at 264. 
34. See Louis Marin, PORTRAIT OF THE KING 9-13 (Martha Houle, trans., Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press 1988), quoted in Kahn, supra note 8, at 268. 
35. There is a difference of course, for example, between the absolute monarchy of France and 
the parliamentary monarchy of England. 
36. See, for example, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Du CONTRAT SOCIAL (1762). 
37. Malcolm N Shaw, INTERNATIONAL LAW 46 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997). 
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In this case while the internal structure of power was affected, there were 
no fundamental alterations of the system. 
Within the context of the belief in states' sovereignty, there is a 
horizontal allocation of authority.38 In this system there is no "universal 
jurisdiction" of any kind, but rather a juxtaposition of independent 
territorial jurisdictions. The mechanisms established to protect and 
reproduce this allocation of authority are as follows: internally, sovereign 
states ensure the effective control of the government over their 
population39 by endowing the government with the legitimate use of 
force. Alongside the use of force, less coercive methods are used to 
ensure national cohesion: various means ranging from the use of a 
common language, legal system, education, infrastructure, etc. foster the 
sense of a national identity and thus the legitimacy of a "social contract" 
within the nation. 
Externally this system relies on the use of force as an essential 
mechanism of enforcement; force between states is legitimate to prevent 
any attempt of unwanted interference by another. Force toward non-state 
actors is also always legitimate to strengthen the power of the very 
system. Just like Christendom legitimized conquest in the name of God, 
the European state system legitimized the conquest of non-state actors in 
the name of the inherent superiority of state sovereignty reserved for 
civilized nations.40 Force was also acceptable when originating from 
powerful states and exercised upon weaker ones if those weaker states at 
any point menaced the status quo. Krassner identifies 198 cases of 
intervention to change domestic regimes between 1555 and 2000.41 
Unlike the previous era, the Westphalian system developed an 
increasingly sophisticated legal system regulating the relations between 
states. The positivist influence on the development of international law 
served to protect states' interests, and in many cases to legitimize their 
conduct. For example, "states carried on wars and wars profited the 
successful states materially as well as in 'psychic income' whence the 
centrality of war and the so called laws of war to internationallaw."42 In 
that sense, law legitimized, for example, self-defense as a right. 
3S. See, among others, Hedley Bull, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN 
WORLD POLITICS (NY: Columbia University Press, 2(02). 
39. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Art. I , Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat 
3097: The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a 
permanent population; (b) a defined temtory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations 
with the other states. 
40. Sarooshi, supra note 4, at IllS. 
41. Krassner, supra note 7, at 1079. 
42. lochnick and Nornand, supra note 23, at 49,95. 
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Self-defense ensured the protection of the entire system and its very 
survival. By practice or by treaties, the law of nations, or international 
law was built on the common understanding by dominant powers of 
sovereignty and its institutional consequences. On this point, Kahn 
quoting (with alarm) Carl Schmitt is particularly relevant: 
Schmitt is right, however, to see that the same sovereign 
po we r that is the source of law is the source of war. The 
more a community understands itself as apolitical 
people, the more it will find an ultimate meaning in that 
identity. It will protect that identity even at the cost of 
great sacrifice. In short every war looks like a war of 
self-defense to those who pursue it.43 
As a result, there has been a progressive fusion of naturalist and 
positivist approaches of international law, whereby the naturalist 
perspective held the notion that state sovereignty carried with it universal 
validity, the very existence of which justified explicit regulations to 
protect it. This was actually reinforced by the concept of popular 
sovereignty that emerged after the American and French Revolutions. 
By transferring internal sovereignty from the state apparatus to the 
people, to the nation, or to individuals believed to have inalienable 
(natural) rights, the very concept of sovereignty became untouchable; as 
universally true as human rights themselves. Or, as Kahn puts it: 
The achievement of the modern politics of popular 
sovereignty was to link the organic unity of the Church 
to the enlightenment belief in reason. [ ... J This synthesis 
gave us a poweiful experience of meaning along with the 
capacity to aspire for justice; literally a national Church 
of liberalism. It also gave us a deeply militarized state 
that could call upon the ample willingness of its citizens 
to sacrifice. It gave us law and war. 44 
Once again, this period has been faced with many challenges from 
non-dominant powers or individuals excluded from the realm of 
legitimacy. However, the period has shown remarkable consistency in 
the hegemonic belief in state sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction. 
Challenges came from colonized territories, especially after World War 
II, but those were soon absorbed in the system of sovereign states. 
Challenges have come more recently, in a fairly similar fashion to what 
43. Kahn, supra note 8, at 263. 
44. Kahn, supra note 8, at 282. 
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occurred in the Middle Ages with the merchant class, from transnational 
economic actors, especially transnational corporations. This concern is 
addressed in much of the current literature on globalization and 
sovereignty.45 Challenges are also coming from other non-state actors: 
the neo humanists possibly represented by non-governmental 
organizations and a growing international civil society.46 Challenges also 
arise from more dangerous groups, possibly the "neo- heretics" of our 
time: terrorists and organized criminal groups. 
PART II 
This paper will now argue that this mostly consensual period among 
dominant powers has now reached an end. We are witnessing a much 
talked about crisis of the "Western alliance."47 I argue that the current 
contrasting perspectives on sovereignty offer enlightening debate. This 
crisis is not completely unexpected, especially when examining 
US-Franco relations prior to and following wwn. However, the end of 
the Cold War has marked a much deeper schism, and I agree with Smith 
that it has "raised the possibility that the European Union and the United 
States face a context of much more fundamental risk and uncertainty."48 
Since WWII, there have been many periods of tension and disagreement 
between France and the United States: the uneasy relationship between 
DeGaulle and the United States, French withdrawal from the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, French anti-American sentiments during 
the Vietnam war, many demonstrations in France over then Vice 
President George Bush's statement that the U.S. was the leader of the 
free world, and the refusal of the French government to President 
Ronald Reagan's plan of overflight on the way to bomb Libya are just a 
few of the marks of a troubled relationship. However, throughout the 
Cold War, the Western alliance (including the sometimes reluctant 
France) remained fairly intact in proposing an anti-communist front. The 
end of the Cold War and the promise of a new world order led to a 
shifting and repositioning of policies. Since then, we have seen an 
increasingly pronounced contrast between the United States and the 
European Union (with the exception of the United Kingdom) and 
45. See for example David Strang, From Dependency to Sovereignty: An Event History 
Analysis of Global Decolonization 1870-1987, 846 AM. Soc. REv. (1990). 
46. See, for example,. RESTRUCfURING WORLD POLfnCS: TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS, NElWORKS AND NORMS (Sanjeev Khagram, Kathryn Sikkick & James Riker, Eds., 
University of Minnesota Press 2002). 
47. See, for example, Robert Kagan, OF PARADISE AND POWER; AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE 
NEW WORLD ORDER (New York: Knopf: 2003). 
48. Michael Smith Between Two Worlds? The European Union, the US and World Order 
41 INT'L POL. 95-112 (2004). 
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especially with France over policy, culminating with the disagreement 
over the conflict with Iraq. As explained by Smith: 
The accumulation of a wide range of disputes ... [has] 
created a situation in which both internally and 
externally the Europeans and the Americans base 
institutional behavior on the assumption of difference 
rather than on the assumption of convergence.49 
Therefore, it is important at this point, to examine in succession the 
American and the French perspectives on sovereignty, the system of 
meaning they each assign to this concept, and how it shapes policies 
especially in regards to the use of force. 
I. THE UNITED STATES' PERSPECTIVE 
The United States' perception of sovereignty is articulated around two 
prongs: the persistence in hanging on to a classical Westphalian 
perspective and the projection of a strong belief in U.S. exceptionalism. 
Recent statements and activities of the United States are in accordance 
with the classic Westphalian approach described earlier. This approach 
places the ultimate and supreme sovereignty in the state and confers on 
sovereignty, thus defined an ontological value, while asserting the 
positivist nature of international law. The United States seems to operate 
on the assumption that its sovereignty can never be trumped by an 
international norm to which it does not explicitly adhere. To a great 
degree this position has remained unchanged since Chief Justice 
Marshall's classic dictum in the Schooner Exchange case in 1812: 
the Jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is 
necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible to no 
limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, 
deriving validity from an external source would imply a 
diminution of sovereignty. 50 
So, while the United States enters into international treaties, and 
therefore agrees to be bound by certain rules, it consistently holds true to 
the fact that international law is always subordinate to the Constitution. 
Indeed, the "Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that just as with 
[c]ongressional statutes, treaties must be consistent with the 
49. [d. at 101. 
50. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116 (1812). 
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Constitution."51 In so far as it is grounded in treaties, international law 
would thus seem securely subordinate to the Constitution and the powers 
invested in the Federal government. Indeed, the United States often 
pleads to internal legal authorities to mitigate, or refute, its international 
obligations.52 The State, ultimately sovereign (knowing no superior 
power), therefore, can only rely on itself for matters of security. It is 
commonplace that "major concerns include [ ... J in international affairs, 
avoiding exogenous constraints on sovereign prerogative, especially in 
the area of national security."53 Undeniably the United States' 
perspective is anchored in the realist belief in an anarchic world system.54 
And while the United States was instrumental in proposing a jus ad 
bellum that would limit the use of force (Briand Kellogg pact of 1928, 
United Nations Charter), it never suggested unconditionally forgoing the 
use of force in all circumstances. Self-defense is central in the U.N. 
Charter and is an established "inherent"55 right, and subsequently a 
corollary to statehood. While it is often read that the U.N. Charter 
abolished the use of force as a tool of policy, the Charter also has to be 
read as merely redefining the limits in which war is legal or legitimate 
and as reasserting the use of force as the exclusive prerogative of states. 
The Charter, in this light, institutionalized a "sovereignty centered 
collective security."56 
The United States' position on sovereignty, very well presented by 
Rabkin, is that it "serves as a legitimizing notion for a foreign policy 
based essentially on a unilateral - some would say insular - definition of 
national action and responsibility."57 This conception of state 
sovereignty as the ultimate locus of authority, to which any international 
legislation is relegated to an inferior status, legitimates to an American 
audience the political reasons for the non-ratification of treaties like the 
Kyoto Protocol, the refusal to participate in the International Criminal 
Court. It also legitimates breaching international law and the use of 
unilateral military action. All of these actions are presented as policies 
enacted as a prerogative of sovereignty as well as a way to preserve this 
51. Jeremy Rabkin War, lntematioool Law, and Sovereignty: Reevaluating the Rules of the 
Game in a New Century, 5 CHI. J.INT'L L. 474 (2005). 
52. James C. Hathaway, America Defender of Democratic Legitimacy 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 121, 
132 (2001). 
53. Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty 55 STAN. 
L. REv. 1785 (2003). 
54. See, for example, Kenneth Waltz, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (New York: 
Random House, 1979). 
55. UN Charter, art. 51 (1945). 
56. Mariano-Florentino Cuellar. Reflections on Sovereignty and Collective Security, 
40 STAN. J.INT'L L., No. 211 (Summer 2004). 
57. Rabkin, supra note 51, at 444. 
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sovereignty, thus defined and often portrayed as threatened by 
international law. The validation of several international norms and 
institutions "would interfere with the traditional notion that sovereign 
statehood carries with it the responsibility for defining and maintaining 
the legal order within the territorial boundaries of the nation state."58 
Alongside the classical definition of sovereignty and the realist 
perspective on world order, needs to be added what is often called 
"American exceptional ism" or "the sense that the US has a special moral 
status and mission [that has] resulted in an intensive engagement by the 
US in Foreign Affairs predicated on a belief that America has a unique 
mission to lead the world."59 American exceptionalism contributes to the 
belief that the United States can be exempted from the rules it promotes. 
In this framework, the possibility of unilateral use of force is not only 
legitimized as an act of defense of sovereignty, but as the realization of a 
mission to protect the world order by spreading democracy. This is not 
very different from the Christianization of the Middle Ages, or the 
civilizing mission of the classical Westphalian period. Radon notes that 
"[s]overeignty in the United States is nearly synonymous with the notion 
of American democracy," to the extent that, "[i]n effect it has become an 
emotional flag."60 On this point, Kagan is accurate in remarking that "the 
only stable and successful international order Americans can imagine is 
one that has the United States at its center. Nor can the Americans 
conceive of an international order that is not defended by power, and 
specifically American Power."61 Kagan echoes the official position of 
the United States expressed by Ambassador Richard Hass, former 
director of policy planning at the U.S. Department of State: 
Sovereignty has been the source of stability for more 
than two centuries [. .. J It has also provided a stable 
framework within which representative governments and 
market economies could merge in many nations. At the 
beginning of the 21st century, sovereignty remains an 
58. Rabkin's position summarized in John R. Worth. Globalization and the Myth of Absolute 
National Sovereignty: Reconsidering the "un-signing" of the Rome Statute and the Legacy of 
Senator Bricker, 79lND. L.J. 245 (2004). 
59. Hathaway, supra note 52. 
60. Jenik Radon, Sovereignty: A Political Emotion. not a Concept 40 STAN. J. !NT'L L. 195, 
202 (2004). 
61. Robert Kagan, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE NEW WORW 
ORDER 94 (New York: Knopf200J). 
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essential foundation for peace, democracy, and 
prosperity. 62 
II. THE FRENCH PERSPECTIVE IN A EUROPEAN CONTEXT 
By contrast, the Europeans are moving away from traditional perceptions 
of sovereignty and replacing it with notions of pooled or perforated 
sovereignty; similarly defined by Abram and Antonia Chayes as the 
"new" sovereignty or the right and capacity to participate in international 
institutions.63 This new version of sovereignty proposed (if not fully 
realized) by France and the other Europeans, means that "states that are 
members of the European Union have broken sharply with the tradition 
of state sovereignty. Sovereignty is pooled in the sense that, in many 
areas, states' legal authority over internal and external affairs are 
transferred to the community as a whole, authorizing action, through 
procedures not involving state vetoes."64 The question is whether or not 
this development is perceived in Europe as an abandonment of 
sovereignty, a weakening of the state and its functions, or as a truly new 
definition and conceptualization favorable to the interests of the state and 
its citizens. While there is undoubtedly some political friction over that 
question,65 French constitutional practice suggests that the 
conceptualization of sovereignty is not only new in name alone. Indeed, 
reviewing the decisions made by the Conseil Constitutionel, Professor 
Combacau confirms that "international law and French law are 
essentially compatible and that international law is by nature not contrary 
to French sovereignty."66 The French have adopted a monist approach to 
international law, unlike the increasingly dualistic approach of the United 
States. 
Furthermore, Comabacau's reading of perspectives on sovereignty as it 
appears in constitutional practice argues that sovereignty remains intact 
even when there is a transfer of competence (for example to the 
European Community). In that sense there are no limitations of 
62. Richard N. Haas, President, Council on Foreign Relations, Sovereignty, Existing Rights, 
Evolving Responsibilities, Remarks at the School of Foreign Service and the Morganthau Center for 
International Studies, Georgetown University (January 14,2003), available at, 
http://www.georgetown.edu/sfsldocumentslhaas_sovereignty _20030114.pdf. 
63. Abram and Antonia Chayes, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995). 
64. Keohane, supra note 1, at 312. 
65. France and the Netherlands voted 'no' to the European Constitution. 
66. n n'existe pas dans Ie droit fran<;ais de domaine qui ne puisse etre regis concurrernment par 
des regles internationales et cela n'est pas juge contraire a la souverainete de la France. (translation 
is that of the author). 
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sovereignty: the transfer of competence is in itself an exercise of full 
sovereignty. 
In this Comabacau agrees with Slaughter that: 
however paradoxical it sounds, the measurement of a 
state's capacity to act as an independent unit within the 
international system-the condition that sovereignty 
purports both to grant and describe- depends on the 
breadth and depth of its links to other states. 67 
As a result of this practice, the benefits of division of competence in a 
mutually accepted framework are apparent. By replacing self-help by a 
normative framework the Europeans have lessened the risk of inter-state 
wars and offer a viable alternative to the violent world order that is 
seemingly perpetuated by the United States. In that sense, the Europeans 
have adopted what Ruggie68 calls, a multi "perspectival" view and are, 
thus, promoting what Smith calls "civilian values," by offering a "quite 
distinctive range of normative concerns, of domestic political 
considerations and linkages between 'hard' and 'soft' security."69 By 
opposition to the United States' warrior-type70 model of self-help and 
exceptionalism that can only survive under the Westphalian system that 
legitimates the use of force, even unilateral, to protect sovereignty, we 
can see the sketch of a new model of state sovereignty based not on 
exclusive territorial jurisdiction, but rather a locus of jurisdiction that 
allows transfers of competence, based on multilateralism and on 
overlapping allocations of authority. 
TIl. ANALYSIS, STAKES AND CONFRONT AnON 
The questions to ask, and hopefully to answer, at this point are multifold. 
Is the French/European model viable or is it in Rabkin's term "an act of 
foolish submission?"71 Quite the contrary, I believe that the model 
advocated by the French government is the expression of a belief that 
new challenges of security or otherwise can be better met by a new 
model than by an old one. Professor Rabkin reminds us of WWII and 
that "if all people were as submissive as the Dutch or the French proved 
to be, we might have universal peace - or we might have universal 
67. Anne Marie Slaughter Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order 
40 STAN. J.INT'L L 283,286 (2004). 
68. Ruggie, supra note 16. 
69. Smith, supra note 48, at lOt. 
70. [d. at 108. 
71. Rabkin, supra note 51. 
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tyranny."72 This statement, echoed widely in the United States, 
presupposes that attempts at negotiated peace and multilateralism amount 
to a relinquishing of sovereignty and can only lead to tyranny. It is 
important to refute this argument, as it is replete with contradictions. 
The period preceding WWII was that of classical sovereignty, and ultra 
nationalism that ultimately lead to war. By contrast, since WWII the 
European pooling of sovereignty (starting with France and Germany) has 
now eradicated the risk of an intra state war in Western Europe. Instead 
of instating tyranny, democracy has been strengthened. 
The second issue to resolve is if the French! European model is foolish or 
actually viable and potentially successful. Additionally, can it co-exist 
with the American paradigm? In other words, what are the tangible 
stakes of what is otherwise an interesting but purely theoretical debate? 
Is it more than the continuation of a Franco - American competition for 
"moral superiority?" Absolutely. The final goal of this paper is to argue 
that contrasting perspectives on sovereignty set the stage for a much 
broader reaching confrontation, the outcome of which could drastically 
alter the economic and political stability of both countries. 
For the most part, the French and European paradigm of pooled 
sovereignty appears to be a success. Europe is a formidable economic 
powerhouse of 25 countries that boasts an $11 trillion dollar economy, 
455 million people, and a currency that is slowly supplanting the United 
States dollar in world reserves.73 Meanwhile, Europe has, once again for 
the most part, managed to acquire leadership in key economic sectors 
while preserving the basic tenets of a functioning welfare system of 
allocating significant budget outlays for social services and reining in 
defense expenditures.74 Meanwhile, the United States economic model, 
while producing superior results in terms of Gross Domestic Product,15 
cannot hide embarrassing rankings in terms of people living in poverty, 
infant mortality, and lack of health care and education.76 Contrary to 
Kagan's view that France's policies, like that of other Europeans "[are] 
72. Id. 
73. See for example CIA World factbook figures available at 
https://www.cia.govllibrary/publications/the-world-factbooklindex.hunl(lastvisitedFeb.IS. 200S), 
Menzie Chinn &Jeffrey Frankel, Will the Euro Eventually Surpass the Dollar as Leading 
Inte17Ultional Reserve Currency?, available at, 
http://wage.wisc.edulpublications/working-papers/index.aspx. 
74. See for example, lohan Lembke, COMPETITION FOR TECHNOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP: 
EU POLICY FOR HIGH TECHNOLOGY (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2002). 
75. See for example Stein Kuhnle, Survival of the European Welfare State, available at, 
http://www.arena.uio.no/pu blicati ~ns/working-papers 1999. 
76. See for example Quality of Life in the United States - How we stack up, available at, 
http://www.dailykos.comlstoryonly/2005/Sn/20486/49640. 
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to be seen as a rationalization of the essential weakness of the European 
power,"77 it can easily be asserted that French and European policies 
have established a very strong power. 
Furthermore, what seems to be more relevant to this analysis is the 
normative power that the European paradigm is gathering. As Ryan 
Goodman and Derek Jinks convincingly argue, the European ideology is 
spreading though a constructivist approach. 
Through processes of social learning and persuasion, "actors" internalize 
new norms and rules of appropriate behavior and redefine their interest 
and identities accordingly.78 
If the European version prevails, then "becoming or being a sovereign 
state would mean the participation of as many government officials as 
possible in plurilateral, regional and global government networks."79 In 
the words of Smith: "the EU offers an essentially different approach to 
world leadership, emphasizing the development of negotiated order and 
the mobilization of normative power."80 
The European approach creates significant consequences for the United 
States. Paul Kahn insists on the growing attraction of the European 
model: "For many around the world, the question is how to become more 
like the Europeans, which means less like the Americans."81 This 
ideological loss for the United States could also precipitate an economic 
decline. For example, in one of his visits to Latin America, President 
Bush was quite remarkable in his inability to convince Argentina and 
other Latin American countries, which depend largely on the United 
States, to enter into certain trade agreements.82 This failure should be 
noted as much more than a simple hurdle in an otherwise privileged 
relationship. It also takes place in the broader current of Latin America 
moving away from United States control. Of course, one cannot evade 
the topic of Iraq and how United States' use of force without broad 
multilateral support is failing to bring the announced results, while 
seriously shredding the moral legitimacy of the American model. 
77. Kagan, supra note 47. 
78. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 53. 
79. Slaughter, supra note 67, at 325. 
80. Smith, supra note 48, at 104. 
8!. Kahn, supra note 8, at 264. 
82. No Free Trade Agreement at Summit, MAR DEL PLATA, Argentina, Nov. 6, 2005., 
available at, http://www.cbsnews.com!storiesl2005/l1l-6/worldlmain 1015872.shtml. 
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This being said, is it feasible for the United States to adhere to a 
European concept of pooled sovereignty and agree to greater 
participation in international norms, treaties, and institutions (from 
Kyoto, to CEDA W, to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to the 
ICC, etc.)? It would partly mean, following Krieger's advice, that the 
United States: 
should free itself from the mentality about strategic 
power that sees only brute force and the threat of force 
as the guarantor of the international order. It should 
move past the mindset (shared by Kagan) that views the 
Europeans alternatives of diplomacy, appeals to 
international law, and consensus driven policies as little 
more than unseeingly squeamishness about the use of 
force. 83 
This would require a complete shift not only of foreign policy, but of 
domestic economic polices. Indeed, most of American productivity 
relies on military spending.B4 It implies the need to justify an 
astronomical defense budget85 required by the willingness to use force 
more than law, and hard power more than soft power to conduct foreign 
affairs.86 Abandoning the classical Westphalian concept of sovereignty 
linked, as aforementioned, to the ability to use force unilaterally if 
required, would force a complete reconfiguration of the United States 
economy, the details of which obviously go beyond the scope of this 
paper. Kahn warns that "when contemporary scholars or leaders declare 
that sovereignty is no longer an appropriate ideal [ ... J they are proposing 
to United States a change as significant as a the Reformation was in the 
Christian experience. "87 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Therefore, it can be asserted that it still remains more feasible for the 
United States to weaken the European model and/or construction and to 
influence each European country individually to readopt a more 
nationalistic perspective to their identity. If this is plausible, then many 
83. Joel Krieger, GLOBALIZATION AND STATE POWER: WHO WINS WHEN AMERJCA RULES 55 
(NY: Pearson Longamn, 2005). 
84. James M. Cypher, The Iron Triangle: the New Military Build up Dollars and Sense 
magazine, January/February 2002 available at, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com. 
85. See FY 2007 Budget Proposal: Agency-by Agency Breakdown, available at, 
http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-srv Ipoli tics/interacti ves/budget07/agencies .htmt. 
86. Pascal Boniface, LA FRANCE CONTRE L'EMPIRE 15 (paris: Robert Laffont, 2003). 
87. Khan, supra note 8, at 277. 
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recent and more than likely upcoming confrontations between France 
and the United States will not merely be diplomatic differences resulting 
from different styles. For example, in this light, Rumsfeld's statement of 
"old Europe v. new Europe"88 was far from being a mere boorish 
blunder, but more a deliberate attempt at creating dissent within the 
continent. Many such events can be analyzed in this framework, and 
while labeling this trend the new cold war may be going too far,89 it, 
nonetheless, appears to be an increasingly heated posturing. 
88. Rumsfeld Repeats "Old Europe" Comments 11.06.2003, available at, 
http:/www.dw-wprld.deldw/articlelO .. 890806.html. 
89. Andrew 0' Hehir. Welcome to the New Cold War, available at, 
http://dir.salon.com!storylbooks/feature/2004/11/15/europelindex.html. 
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